Atheistic Prayer by Kleinschmidt, Shieva
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 




Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Kleinschmidt, Shieva (2017) "Atheistic Prayer," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers: Vol. 34 : Iss. 2 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol34/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
ATHEISTIC PRAYER
Shieva Kleinschmidt
In this paper I will argue, contrary to common assumptions, that rational 
atheistic prayer is possible. I will formulate and respond to two powerful ar-
guments against the possibility of atheistic prayer: first, an argument that the 
act of prayer involves an intention to communicate to God, precluding dis-
belief in God’s existence; second, an argument claiming that reaching out to 
God through prayer requires believing God might exist, precluding rational 
disbelief in God. In showing options for response to these arguments, I will 
describe a model on which atheistic prayer is not only possible, but is on a par 
with theistic prayer in many more ways than one might expect.
A young man is in a car accident, and spends a month in a coma. The MRIs 
do not give reason to hope. Eventually he recovers, but for that first month 
his family members are unsure whether he will wake. Over several weeks, 
his sister prays for him. She prays for God to watch over him and their 
family, to mend his brain, and to bring him back to consciousness. There 
is one catch: she is an atheist.
It is often accepted that atheists cannot pray.1 We hear of “foxhole con-
versions” all the time: atheists in dire circumstances who pray to God 
and, since it is assumed that atheists cannot pray to God, thereby indicate 
that they have become theists (or were theists all along). From the other 
side, it is not uncommon for atheists to become annoyed at or puzzled by 
requests for prayer from theists; the assumption of the recipients of such 
requests seems to be that, since atheistic prayer is impossible, the request 
amounts to pressure to convert to theism.
In what follows, I will not only argue against the widespread assump-
tion that atheists cannot pray, I will argue that atheistic prayer is on a par 
with theistic prayer in many more ways than one might expect. Following 
some stage-setting in § 1 addressing the question of what it is to pray to 
God, in § 2 I will present evidence that there is a widespread assumption 
that atheists cannot pray to God in the way theists do. I will show how 
the arguments behind two common sentiments (one often endorsed by 
1I will be using “atheist” to mean simply someone who believes God does not exist. (This is in 
contrast with “practical atheism,” which does not require disbelief in God but does require 
a subject’s acting as if they disbelieve in God.) I am happy for readers to take “God” to mean 
whatever they’d like (reading it as a name, a definite description for something omnipotent, 
omniscient, omnibenevolent, etc., or a description of a different sort of entity altogether).




theists, one often endorsed by atheists) depend on the assumption that 
atheists cannot pray to God. I will also show that atheistic “prayer,” when 
it is discussed, is typically treated as merely a kind of mimicry of theistic 
prayer. In § 3 I will formulate what I take people to have in mind when 
they say atheistic prayer to God is incoherent: according to the Meta-
physical Incoherence Objection, atheistic prayer is either conceptually 
incoherent or a subject’s praying to God entails something metaphysically 
incompatible with their endorsing atheism. In § 3.2, in response to the 
Metaphysical Incoherence Objection, I will present a picture of atheistic 
prayer presented by John Lemos and Tim Mawson, and based on a model 
of agnostic prayer presented by Anthony Kenny.2 In § 3.3 I will show that 
this sort of model can be expanded to show a variety of ways in which 
atheistic prayer is on a par with theistic prayer, including allowing for 
communication with God and development of a relationship with God. In 
§ 4 I will present a second objection to atheistic prayer to God, and to the 
model presented in § 3.2. According to the Epistemic Incoherence Objec-
tion, atheistic prayer involves an either epistemically or metaphysically 
unacceptable combination of doxastic states. In § 4.1 I present one way 
of arguing for this, by claiming that even if our model of atheistic prayer 
is roughly correct, in order to pray a subject must believe that God might 
exist. And a subject either cannot or should not believe that God might 
exist while also believing that God does not exist. In § 4.2 I will discuss 
several options for response to this instance of the Epistemic Incoher-
ence Objection, falling into two categories: (i) objections to the general 
worries raised for the compatibility of statements or propositions of the 
form might(p) and ¬p, and (ii) objections to the appli cation of these wor-
ries to the topic of atheistic prayer to God. I will conclude that there are 
many ways to maintain the coherence of atheistic prayer to God, and such 
prayer may be more similar to theistic prayer than we imagined: if God 
exists, atheistic prayer may allow atheists to communicate with God and 
form a lasting and evolving relationship with Him, all while believing 
that God does not exist.3
1. What Does It Mean to Pray?
Before we ask about whether atheists can pray to God, we should ex-
amine what it means for anyone to pray to God. The word “prayer” may 
mean quite different things in different contexts, and has been taken to 
mean different things over time. For instance, early Christian authors,4 
2Lemos, “An Agnostic Defence of Obligatory Prayer”; Mawson, “Praying to Stop Being 
an Atheist”; Kenny, The God of the Philosophers.
3Of course, I will not argue that atheistic prayer is on a par with theistic prayer in all 
respects. Some important features of a relationship do depend on actually believing the other 
entity exists. But where a theist may trust God, or fear God, an atheist may conditionally do 
so (though I do not wish to take a stand on which way we ought to cash that out).
4For discussion of this, see Tugwell, “Prayer, Humpty Dumpty, and Thomas Aquinas,” 
and Dupuy, “Oraison” (the latter is discussed in relation to Aquinas in Davies, “Prayer”).
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including Thomas Aquinas, endorsed the following (noting that Aquinas 
took prayers of thanksgiving to be petitions for God’s attention5):
“prayer to God” =df a petition directed toward God.
On this reading of “prayer,” prayers should have a particular purpose: to 
ask God for things (and, if Aquinas is right, sometimes to ask God for His 
attention in order to thank Him). Expressions of penitence and praise, if 
they do not involve petitions, will not count as prayers. For some, this may 
be a welcome result. Hugh of Saint Victor discussed this view in his De 
virtute orandi; Tugwell comments “that some people were evidently quite 
disturbed by the fact that when we pray . . . we say a lot of things to God 
in which we do not ask for anything: it is a mockery rather than prayer 
to come before God as if to ask for something and then suddenly turn 
aside to other things which are quite irrelevant.”6 However, contemporary 
views are far more permissive. We tend to think that one can pray by, for 
instance, kneeling by a bedside telling God about your day at work, or 
about your happy anticipation of tomorrow’s lunch with your mother. If 
we wish to allow non-petitionary, communicative acts directed at God to 
count as prayer, we may offer a less restricted account of prayer to God:
“prayer to God” =df a communicative act directed toward God.
This allows that, when directed toward God, official prayers in church, 
petitions and expressions of gratitude, and informal chatter all count as 
prayers to God.
5In the Summa Theologica II-II.Q.83.A17, Aquinas says
Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, that the person who prays should 
approach God Whom he prays: this is signified in the word “prayer,” because 
prayer is “the raising up of one’s mind to God.” The second is that there should be 
a petition, and this is signified in the word “intercession.” On this case sometimes 
one asks for something definite, and then some say it is “intercession” properly so 
called, or we may ask for some thing indefinitely, for instance to be helped by God, 
or we may simply indicate a fact, as in John 11:3, “Behold, he whom Thou lovest 
is sick,” and then they call it “insinuation.” The third condition is the reason for 
impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the part of God, or on the part of 
the person who asks. The reason of impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, 
on account of which we ask to be heard, according to Daniel 9:17–18, “For Thy 
own sake, incline, O God, Thy ear”; and to this pertains “supplication” which 
means a pleading through sacred things, as when we say, “Through Thy nativity, 
deliver us, O Lord.” The reason for impetration on the part of the person who asks 
is “thanksgiving”; since “through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to 
receive yet greater benefits.”
One way of reading this is as claiming that there are three conditions on prayer: that it’s 
directed toward God, involves a petition, and is motivated by the right kind of reason (or 
maybe, a reason is given). Thanksgiving is counted as a petition for God’s attention, moti-
vated by our interest in being deserving of additional goods. Idle chatter aimed at God may 
not count as prayer on Aquinas’s account, because though it involves a petition for God’s 
attention, it may not be motivated by the right sorts of reasons (or include expression of 
those reasons).
6Tugwell, “Prayer, Humpty Dumpty, and Thomas Aquinas,” 24, discussing De virtute 
orandi, PL 176, 981–982.
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A puzzle arises for this account of prayer to God, however. Suppose you 
were among the disciples at the Last Supper. You’re sitting near Jesus and 
you ask Him to pass the bread, as you might ask your sibling to. Or you’re 
at the market and bump into Him and, without realizing who it is, say 
“Oh! Excuse me!” Even if we think that Jesus is God, intuitively these do 
not count as instances of prayer. However it does seem that, in principle, 
one could sit next to Jesus and pray to him, “Lord, please give me bread,” 
or in the market offer up the prayer “Please excuse my trespass.” If we do 
want to separate these acts, how might our account do so?
One might claim that in the cases where one talks to God without 
praying to Him, communicative acts are being directed toward God, but 
not at God qua divine entity. We may modify our account slightly:
“prayer to God” =df a communicative act directed toward God qua di-
vine entity.
There are multiple objections one may raise to this account,7 and I take 
the question of what prayer is to be far from settled. But for our purposes, 
it is enough to note that it seems likely that any account we end up with 
will include the necessary condition that a communicative act is directed 
toward God.
There are, of course, some accounts of prayer that do not include this 
necessary condition. Tugwell and Davies note that St. Bonaventure takes 
prayer, in its broadest sense, to mean “every good deed.”8 St. Augustine 
endorsed a similarly broad account of prayer, noting that it helps us in 
making sense of the instruction to pray without ceasing: “For it is your 
heart’s desire that is your prayer; and if your desire continues uninter-
rupted, your prayer continues also. For not without a meaning did the 
Apostle9 say, ‘Pray without ceasing.’”10 Though these senses of “prayer” 
are important, they are more broad than the sense I will be concerned with 
in relation to atheism.
7For instance: suppose you’re at the Last Supper and you ask the Son to pass the bread, but 
you are also well aware of the Son’s divinity, and you’re pretty nervous as you ask Him. You’re 
not asking Him to pass the bread in any particularly divine way, but you are definitely thinking 
of Him qua divine entity as you ask. Is this enough to make your request a prayer, while an oth-
erwise indistinguishable request made by someone less aware would not count as a prayer? 
 And a second worry: if we think we can also pray to non-divine entities such as 
angels and saints, we need to modify our account of prayer to God to produce something 
that is more easily generalizable. For instance, we may appeal to the property of holiness, 
producing the following general account of prayer (perhaps with additional restrictions, to 
preclude praying to things like holy locations):
“prayer” =df a communicative act directed toward holy entities qua holy entities.
8Davies, “Prayer,” 467.
91 Thessalonians 5:17.
10Augustine, Exposition on Psalm 38, 13. He goes on, “Are we to be ‘without ceasing’ 
bending the knee, prostrating the body, or lifting up our hands . . . ? Or if it is in this sense 
that we say that we ‘pray,’ this, I believe, we cannot do ‘without ceasing.’ There is another 
inward kind of prayer without ceasing, which is the desire of the heart. Whatever else you 
are doing, if you do but long for that Sabbath, you do not cease to pray.”
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My arguments will apply to prayer to God understood as communica-
tive acts directed at God, and I will remain neutral on whether there are 
additional restrictions on the kinds of communicative acts involved (as 
Aquinas thought), and on whether the prayers must be directed at God 
qua divine (or holy, etc.) entity. In what follows, “prayer to God” may be 
read as meaning a communicative act directed toward God.
2. Atheistic Prayer’s Assumed Impossibility
It is often assumed that atheists cannot pray to God (that is, pray in a way 
that is directed at God, even if God exists). There are two sorts of evidence 
for this: first, there are popular arguments given that seem to assume that 
atheistic prayer to God is impossible. Second, when discussions do allow 
for atheistic prayer, it is often not taken to be prayer to God, or prayer 
anything like theistic prayer except in appearance.
2.1. Arguments Assuming the Impossibility of Atheistic Prayer to God
Arguments assuming the impossibility of atheistic prayer have been given 
by atheists and by theists. For instance, consider discussion of “foxhole 
conversions”: when an atheist is put into dire circumstances, that person 
often ends up praying to God and (it is often concluded) thereby shows 
that he/she has converted to theism (or was never really an atheist). For 
instance, consider this statement by Dwight Eisenhower:
As a former soldier, I am delighted that our veterans are sponsoring a move-
ment to increase our awareness of God in our daily lives. In battle, they 
learned a great truth—that there are no atheists in the foxholes. They know 
that in time of test and trial, we instinctively turn to God for new courage. 
. . . Whatever our individual church, whatever our personal creed, our com-
mon faith in God is a common bond among us.11
These sorts of descriptions of foxhole conversions seem to suggest an ar-
gument along the following lines:
Foxhole Conversions Against Atheistic Prayer
1. Often, when an atheist is in dire circumstances, that person begins to 
pray to God.
2. Atheists cannot pray to God.
3. So, any time an atheist begins to pray to God, this involves that per-
son converting to theism.
One may give an even stronger version of this argument, against atheism 
altogether:
11Dwight D. Eisenhower, February 7, 1954 (broadcast from the White House as part of the 
American Legion “Back To God” Program).
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Foxhole Prayers Against Atheists
1. Often, those who think they are atheists have the disposition that, if 
they were in dire circumstances, they would begin to pray to God.
2. Atheists cannot have the disposition that, if they were in dire cir-
cumstances, they would begin to pray to God.
3. So, often, those who think they are atheists are not atheists.
In support of premise (2) of this argument against atheists, the proponent 
may say: “Atheists cannot pray to God. And in cases of immediate prayers 
to God in response to dire circumstances, the subject often doesn’t have 
a change in their beliefs: they do not gain new evidence that God exists, 
they do not reconsider their earlier determination that God doesn’t exist. 
They simply immediately reach out to God, exercising an inclination to act 
that was there all along. Thus, the elements of prayer to God that preclude 
atheism were present in the subject all along.” So, both of the Foxhole 
arguments depend on the claim that atheists cannot pray to God.
It is not only theists who often say that atheistic prayer to God is impos-
sible. Atheists also often seem inclined to endorse the view that atheists 
cannot pray to God. Atheists sometimes express confusion or annoyance 
when theists ask for their prayers, or when theists communicate that they 
have prayed for them. Some atheists even become upset when a “bless 
you” is uttered in response to a sneeze (or expected in response to one). 
There may be a variety of reasons for these negative responses.12 But when 
atheists express anger or distress following a theist’s request that they 
pray, at least in some cases, something like the following argument seems 
to be motivating them:
Inappropriate Requests for Prayer
1. Atheists, while atheists, cannot pray to God.
2. It is inappropriate to request something of an atheist that, while 
they’re an atheist, they cannot do.
3. So, it is inappropriate to request of atheists that they pray.
That is: if you ask an atheist to pray to God, and praying either requires 
that the atheist converts to theism or, holding fixed that they remain an 
12I want to emphasize that I am not claiming that atheists always or even usually have 
arguments such as the Inappropriate Request for Prayer Argument in mind when they have 
negative reactions to being asked to pray or being told “bless you” in response to a sneeze. 
For instance, they may instead be upset at what they take to be evidence of a widespread be-
lief that everyone should believe in God and be religious. The same frustration may apply to 
saying “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance and the sense that politicians must proclaim 
their belief in God in order to be successful. Atheists may be negatively reacting to what they 
take as evidence of theism/being religious as being treated not only as statistically dominant 
but as normatively dominant as well.
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atheist, is something they cannot do, then you have made an inappro-
priate request.
I do not intend to suggest that the Foxhole arguments I’ve given are 
endorsed by most theists, or that something like the Inappropriate Re-
quests argument is supported by most atheists. Instead, I simply wish to 
note that these seem to be popular arguments, and each depends on the 
assumption that atheistic prayer to God is impossible.
2.2. Limited Atheistic “Prayer”
According to a 2014 PEW Research poll, 3 percent of atheists self-report 
as praying at least monthly, with 1 percent of atheists praying daily.13 But 
discussions of atheistic prayer typically do not focus on prayer to God, 
but rather prayer simpliciter, or prayer to something other than God. (For 
instance, the PEW survey asked about prayer, but not specifically about 
prayer to God.) Atheistic prayer is presented as prayer that involves saying 
the words, performing the actions, and perhaps even reflecting on one’s 
desires and attitudes of fear, love, and gratitude, but not actually directing 
communicative acts toward God.
For instance, in a 2013 Psychology Today article, the author lists a few op-
tions for who or what atheists may be praying to: “The air. The universe. 
The self.” An atheistic blogger says that when he prays, he is addressing 
what he calls the “externality construct”: “I might give it a name, like 
‘The Universe,’ or ‘All-That-Is-Not-Me,’ or ‘Layer Zero,’ . . . but the name 
doesn’t matter. The entity I’m addressing exists in my mind—a construct. 
But it feels like I’m addressing someone outside of myself—an externality.” 
Another praying atheist, discussed in the Washington Post, prays to a god-
dess he made up.
We can find similar sentiments in the philosophical literature as well. 
For instance, David Benatar argues that atheists can reasonably engage 
in religious practices, even “praying” in the sense of saying the words 
theists do.14 But he follows this up by saying, “The foregoing is not to 
deny that there seems to be something odd about atheists offering prayers 
and doing ‘God-talk.’ But this is only so if one takes prayer literally to 
be communication with God. Matters are different if one views it more 
metaphorically or merely as another ritual.”15 Atheistic prayer to God, for 
Benatar, cannot be communication atheists direct at God. Instead, it is a 
mere mimicry of theistic prayer, or communication directed to something 
13An earlier PEW study, in 2012, listed 33 percent of those as identifying as neither 
spiritual nor religious as self-reporting as praying at least monthly. 17 percent of those who 
identify as atheist or agnostic self-report as praying at least monthly. Neither of these pieces 
of information allow us to conclude anything specific about how much those who identify as 
atheists pray, however. (For instance, there may be a lot of praying agnostics. And there may 
be a lot of non-praying atheists who still participate in religious traditions, and so report as 
religious. I don’t want to suggest an interpretation of this information, just that we should be 
cautious in the conclusions we draw from it).
14Benatar, “What’s God Got To Do With It?,” 394.
15Benatar, “What’s God Got To Do With It?,” 396.
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non-divine. Or it may involve heavy use of non-literal language. When 
atheists say “Our Lord in heaven,” Benatar says, they are speaking meta-
phorically, as someone may be when they call their spouse “pumpkin” 
without believing they are married to a pumpkin.16
In addition to atheistic prayer not being presented as prayer to God, 
the reasons given for such atheistic prayer are typically unlike those dis-
cussed for theistic prayer. For atheists, the suggestion is that prayer is 
beneficial primarily because it allows one to participate in a comfortable 
tradition, it encourages self-reflection, it encourages empathy, it provides 
a way to show solidarity with others who pray, etc. In the Washington Post 
article mentioned above, the atheist is described as having a “hunger for 
a transcendent experience,” and wanting the humility that comes with 
petitioning for things out of his control rather than simply desiring them. 
Of course, these can all be benefits for theists as well, but they are typically 
not presented as the central reasons for theists to engage in prayer. In-
stead, for theists the reasons to pray often include fostering a relationship 
with God, increasing focus on and understanding of God,17 communicating 
gratitude and desires, and sometimes, even receiving goods as a result of 
petitioning for them.
It should be noted, some authors do argue that atheistic prayer can be 
motivated by wanting to receive goods from God. Lemos argues that ag-
nostics can, and in fact should, petition God for goods (such as the healing 
of a sick child). He then extends the argument to atheistic prayer. Dumsday 
provides additional reasons for thinking that, given that atheistic prayer 
to God is possible, atheists ought to petition God for goods. And Mawson 
argues that atheists should pray for God to reveal Himself. However, as 
even some of these authors note, they seem to have the minority opinion.
I agree that the motivation typically given for atheistic prayer (en-
couraged self-reflection, development of empathy, etc.) may, indeed, 
be excellent motivation to pray. I also agree that there are many kinds 
of prayer, and that even prayer may be directed toward entities other 
than God. But I will argue that, in attempting to make sense of atheistic 
prayer, we should not assume that any praying atheists must be praying 
to some non-divine entity (such as themselves, the universe, whatever) 
or mimicking the act of prayer. And I will argue that we needn’t assume 
that praying atheists must be doing it primarily for the benefits of self-
reflection, community-building, etc. First, though, because the prevailing 
sentiment is so strongly against the possibility of atheistic prayer, we 
should turn to why that might be the case.
16Benatar, “What’s God Got To Do With It?,” 396.
17For instance, from St. Augustine’s On the Sermon on the Mount (ch. 3, §14): “We are not 
always ready to receive, since we are inclined towards other things, and are involved in 
darkness through our desire for temporal things. Hence there is brought about in prayer 
a turning of the heart to Him, who is ever ready to give, if we will but take what He has 
given.”
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3. The Metaphysical Incoherence Objection
In considering prayer to God as communication directed at God, the im-
mediate objection is that atheistic prayer is incoherent, because directing 
communication at any entity requires believing that the entity exists (or 
at least, not disbelieving that the entity exists). In this section, I’ll more 
carefully present what I take to be the argument against atheistic prayer 
in this vicinity. Then I will discuss the picture of atheistic prayer pre-
sented by Kenny, Lemos, and Mawson, and show how it may be used 
to respond to this argument. Finally, I will expand on this picture of 
atheistic prayer, and describe how it can be used to show that atheistic 
prayer can, in many ways, share the character, motivation, and benefits 
of theistic prayer.
3.1. The Intentionality Argument
The intuition behind this objection to atheistic prayer is that the very no-
tion of praying somehow precludes atheists praying to God. One may 
believe that offering prayer to God is metaphysically incompatible with 
disbelieving in God. Even stronger, one may claim that the notion prayer to 
God analytically entails that the subject lacks disbelief in God; part of the 
concept of prayer to God is belief in God or even just lack of disbelief in God. 
Thus, in addition to finding atheistic prayer metaphysically incoherent, 
one may find it conceptually or analytically incoherent. Assuming that 
analytic impossibility entails metaphysical impossibility, I will present 
these worries together as worries for metaphysical possibility. But it’s 
worth pointing out that there are multiple ways to endorse this line of 
argument.
In attempting to establish the entailment from a subject’s praying to 
God to their lacking disbelief in God, one may claim: directing commu-
nication at an entity requires, as a matter of necessity and perhaps as a 
component of the concept, intending to communicate with that entity. 
That is, they may endorse:
The Intentionality Requirement for Communication: Necessarily, any time 
a subject s directs a communicative act at an entity e, s intends to com-
municate to e.18
There is an immediate objection one may give to this principle, and exam-
ining it will better illuminate what the principle commits us to. Suppose 
it is late at night, and you are struggling to sleep before an early start 
the next morning. A leaky faucet in the next room has been waking you 
each time you’ve nearly lost consciousness. Finally, exasperated, you yell 
at it, “Shut up!” You know it doesn’t hear you, and you never intended it 
to, but you feel a tiny bit better. According to the principle above, either 
18Importantly, the principle does not require that s intends to communicate to e the con-
tent of s’s communicative act. Otherwise, lying and talking to infants would be ruled out as 
directed communicative acts.
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what you performed was not a communicative act directed at the faucet, 
or you briefly intended to communicate to the faucet. While one might 
argue that in your sleepy state you were confused about the faucet’s abili-
ties to understand you, the first alternative is more plausible: sometimes 
things that look like communicative acts are not, really. Things that feel 
like communicative acts may be done out of habit, out of mimicry, etc. 
Something sets genuine communicative acts apart from these imposters, 
and the above principle is a good candidate for drawing this distinction.
In addition to the Intentionality Requirement for Communication, we 
may also wish to endorse a claim about the requirements of some kinds of 
intentions. We may think, either as a matter of necessity or even as an ana-
lytic truth, that any time a subject intends to relate in a particular way to 
something, the subject must think that thing exists (or at least, the subject 
must not believe it doesn’t). That is:
The Belief Requirement for Directed Intentionality: Necessarily, if s intends 
to stand in R to some y such that Fy, then s believes (or at least, lacks 
disbelief) that there exists some z such that Fz.
Intuitions about cases seem to support this principle. You cannot intend to 
visit a house that you believe will never be created. You cannot intend to 
meet a deadline that you think you don’t have. You cannot intend to jump 
over a rock that you believe isn’t there. You can, however, intend to pretend 
you’ll go to such a house, you can act as if you’re meeting such a deadline, 
and you can jump over a rock-hologram or a pretend-rock. Similarly, you 
cannot intend to communicate with something that you think does not 
exist, though you can intend to mimic such communicative acts.
We can combine these principles to produce a Metaphysical Incoher-
ence Argument against the possibility of atheistic prayer. If I believe that 
God does not exist, then I cannot intend to communicate to Him. And if 
I cannot intend to direct communication to Him, I cannot direct a com-
municative act toward Him. The best I can hope for with atheistic prayer, 
then, is a mere mimicking of the actions of theists who pray.
The Intentionality Argument
1. Necessarily, praying to God involves directing communicative acts 
toward God.
2. Necessarily, directing communicative acts toward God involves in-
tending to communicate to God.
3. Necessarily, intending to communicate to someone, x, requires the 
belief (or at least, lack of disbelief) that x exists.
4. Necessarily, if y believes (or at least, lacks disbelief) that God exists, 
then y is not an atheist.
5. So, necessarily, praying to God is incompatible with being an atheist.
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Premise (1) follows from our account of prayer. Premise (2) is an applica-
tion of The Intentionality Requirement for Communication. Premise (3) is 
an application of The Belief Requirement for Directed Intentionality. And 
premise (4), when involving a lack of disbelief, follows from our account 
of atheism. When premise (4) is instead read as involving belief, then it 
gives the result that the subject is not merely an atheist (for they are a theist 
as well), and the conclusion will have to be amended to say that praying 
to God is incompatible with failing to be a theist.
Two notes before we move on to responding to the argument. First, 
once again, it should be observed that an argument like this may moti-
vate one to think that belief in God (or lack of disbelief in God) is partly 
constitutive of prayer to God, but endorsing that claim is not required for 
endorsing the argument.
It should also be noted that there are other options for presenting 
Metaphysical Incoherence Objections to the possibility of atheistic prayer. 
The project is to find a conceptually or metaphysically necessary connec-
tion between prayer to God and lack of disbelief in God. I have chosen 
one route that I take to capture my intuitions about (at least some of) the 
strangeness of atheistic prayer. There are others, and we will return to this 
topic at the conclusion of the next section.
3.2. A Picture of Atheistic Prayer
In responding to the Intentionality Argument, we may already have a par-
ticular premise that we would like to reject. We have, for instance, already 
described objections to the Intentionality Requirement for Communica-
tion, and it is hard to see why that principle would be false but a restricted 
version of the principle applying only to God would be true. However, in 
the literature defending the possibility of atheistic prayer, the defense has 
come by way of analogy. And our response to the Intentionality Argument 
can invoke this as well, allowing us to remain neutral on which premise 
to take to be false.
Anthony Kenny argues that belief in God is not required for praying 
to God. He presents us with analogies, saying, “It is surely no more un-
reasonable than the act of a man adrift in the ocean, trapped in a cave, or 
stranded on a mountainside, who cries for help though he may never be 
heard or fires a signal which may never be seen.”19 In each of these cases, 
a subject seems to direct a communicative act toward an entity meeting 
some description (such as is able to rescue me), in spite of not believing that 
any such person is around to witness it. We are not inclined to say that, 
due to the lack of belief, the subjects in these cases are failing to perform 
directed communicative acts; they are not somehow merely mimicking 
attempts at communication. Similarly, an agnostic may reach out to God 
through prayer, while not believing that God actually exists.
19Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, 129.
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John Lemos has presented similar analogies in relation to atheistic 
prayer, rather than in relation to agnostic prayer. He says:
Suppose that I am sitting in my room working on a project that requires 
the use of some scissors. Suppose it is a time of day in which my wife is 
usually not in the house. Consequently I do not believe that she is in the 
house. Perhaps I even believe that she is out of the house. Even so suppose 
also that I am feeling quite lazy at the time and so I say, “Darling, will you 
please fetch me some scissors from the kitchen” in the faint hope that she 
is there to respond. Here I would have intentionally addressed language to 
someone while not believing that they are present to hear and yet doing so 
is rational.20
In this case the subject disbelieves in the existence of someone meeting a 
particular description (is my wife, and is in the house) but reaches out with 
a communicative action directed at such a person anyway. We are not 
tempted to say that Lemos’s request for scissors in this case fails to be a 
directed communicative act, but his otherwise indistinguishable request 
is a directed communicative act when he believes his wife is at home. And 
just as Lemos may request scissors of his wife in the above situation, we 
may say an atheist can believe that God does not exist, but offer a prayer 
to Him just in case.
Tim Mawson, in response to Kenny’s case, also presents analogies 
showing that atheistic prayer to God seems possible. He says:
The person who prays that God help him or her to believe in Him is as rea-
sonable as someone who finds himself or herself shouting ‘Is anyone there?’ 
in a darkened room about which he or she has various reasonable prior be-
liefs. . . . Finding himself or herself in the room today the person . . . realizes 
that he or she has no other more pressing business . . . and shouts, “Is there 
anyone there?”; “If you’re there wise old man, please answer me!” . . . Such 
a person may be reasonable in doing this . . . if an “atheist” about the wise 
old man.21
In Mawson’s case, the person in the darkened room believes there is not 
a wise old man in the room (though the subject is aware of some debate 
about that fact). Still, they direct a communicative act toward any such 
wise old man in the room who may exist.22
The cases presented above seem possible. And in the cases, the subject 
directs communication toward someone though they believe that no such 
person exists. So it cannot be generally true that, necessarily, if x directs a 
communicative act toward y (or toward anyone with some feature, F), then 
20Lemos, “An Agnostic Defense of Obligatory Prayer,” 74–75.
21Mawson, “Praying to Stop Being an Atheist,” 174.
22Mawson’s aim is to show that atheists should, generally, pray to God to reveal Himself. 
Though Mawson describes several constraints on this norm, including the condition that it 
applies only when the atheist has the belief that they will not misconstrue any responses. I 
will not include any such restrictions, in part because I am interested primarily in the pos-
sibility and epistemic coherence of atheistic prayer; the issue of whether engaging in it is a 
good idea is beyond the scope of this paper.
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x must believe that y exists (or must believe that someone with feature F 
exists). But if this general principle does not hold, then we cannot appeal 
to it in support of premises (2) or (3) of the Intentionality Argument. And, 
because prayer to God does not seem relevantly dissimilar to the commu-
nicative acts in the above cases, it does not seem that a restriction of the 
principle to applying only to prayer to God would be plausible. Thus, we 
may present the following argument:
Against the Intentionality Argument
1. The cases described above are possible cases of one person direct-
ing communication toward another person (or toward anyone with a 
particular property), though they believe that no such person exists.
2. These cases are relevantly similar to an atheist directing communica-
tion toward God, though they believe God does not exist.
3. So, it is possible for an atheist to direct communication toward God, 
though they believe God does not exist.
One may reject this argument by rejecting my claim that the communica-
tive acts in the cases above are relevantly similar to atheistic prayer to 
God. One way to do so is to claim that prayer is not any ordinary form of 
communication. Prayer to God has special features that place extra restric-
tions on its practice, and which preclude atheists in participating in it.
Offering this objection will require endorsing a different version of 
the Metaphysical Incoherence Objection, based on the special aspects of 
prayer that set it apart from typical communication. For instance, one may 
claim that prayer to God requires not only directing communication to-
ward God, but also approaching God with faith.
I think this strategy is a natural way for the proponent of the Meta-
physical Incoherence Objection to go, and this particular example of how 
to carry it out is initially compelling. Prayer does seem to be a special form 
of communication in many ways, and approaching God with faith seems 
to be an important part of having a thriving relationship with Him. It is 
tempting to bundle these features into our account of prayer. However, it 
may result in an account that is overly restrictive: we do not want to claim 
that, when someone who is ordinarily a theist is having a sudden and 
significant crisis of faith, perhaps enough to plunge them into agnosti-
cism, they are unable to pray. They may be unable to pray with faith, but 
it seems they can still reach out to God. Our requirement, then, cannot be 
that prayer to God always includes faith in God. But it is unclear which 
weaker position we should retreat to. We might claim that prayer to God 
is special in that it requires approaching God with a lack of disbelief in 
Him. This no longer plausibly captures a natural component of prayer; 
it is hard to see why we should think that prayer has this feature and is 
thereby set apart from other forms of communication.
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3.3. Expansion of the Model
If the kinds of cases offered above are analogous to atheistic prayer to 
God, then atheistic prayer to God is more similar to theistic prayer than we 
may have imagined. To see why, consider first my own example of a case 
analogous to atheistic prayer to God, and then an expansion of the case.
Post-Apocalyptic Call: Adam is wandering around in a post-apocalyptic 
wasteland. He comes across a payphone. Adam strongly believes that 
this phone will not succeed in placing calls to any other people: there 
are unlikely to be many other people left, the phone looks broken and 
like it will not succeed in placing calls at all, and whatever infrastructure 
supported placing phone calls is likely to have been destroyed. How-
ever, Adam requires rescue in order to live. So, in spite of believing the 
phone will not work (and in spite of believing no one is around to pick 
up even if it does work), Adam lifts the receiver and attempts to place a 
call. After dialing the number, Adam says into the phone, “Hello, I need 
rescue. I’m at [address].”
 Adam strongly believes that there is no one at the other end of the 
line. However, Adam nonetheless attempts to communicate a message 
to such a person. And, if the phone call succeeds, Adam may success-
fully communicate a message to such a person.
Again, if there can be communicative acts directed toward a (perhaps non-
existent) person in a possible case like this one, then it seems that one 
could direct communicative acts toward (perhaps non-existent) God. In 
my case, it seems that either Adam directs a communicative act toward 
someone at the other end of the line without (due perhaps to lack of 
hope) intending to communicate with such a person, or Adam intends 
to communicate with such a person, but is not thereby precluded from 
disbelieving that such a person exists. Our attitudes about which of these 
options is more plausible give us some guide to which of the premises of 
The Intentionality Argument to reject.
But here’s what’s new: consider the following extension of the previous 
case.
Post-Apocalyptic Conversation: Adam was too close to the apocalyptic 
explosions, and is now unable to hear clearly. Upon dialing the number 
and waiting an appropriate amount of time, Adam says “Hello, I need 
rescue. I’m at [address].” Adam then hears something. It might be a 
person saying “Please repeat that. Say your address again.” Adam actu-
ally and strongly believes, though, that it is merely a recording saying 
“Please hang up and try your call again” indicating that the call was 
unsuccessful. Because of Adam’s diminished ability to hear, because 
what Adam did manage to hear sounded more like the recording than a 
person asking for the address, and because of Adam’s strong evidence 
that the infrastructure needed for his call to be placed has been de-
stroyed, Adam strongly believes that there is no one at the other end 
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of the line. Still, Adam is desperate, and also has nothing better to do. 
Adam responds by repeating the address.
In this case, if there is a person at the other end of the line, Adam seems 
to be communicating with that person. They can exchange information 
several times, all while Adam believes there is no one there. Adam can 
communicate while being unaware of successfully doing so, and while 
believing that such communication is not occurring.
Similarly, if God exists, an atheist may be able to not only pray to 
God, but also to communicate with God without realizing it. They may 
receive goods as results of their prayers, though believe that the goods 
were received coincidentally. They may receive guidance as a result of 
their inquiries, though believe that the input came from another source 
and was unrelated (or at least, not divinely related) to their questioning. 
They may confide in God, and receive comfort from Him, but believe 
that comfort has a non-divine source. They may thank God for His acts, 
and God may indicate His pleasure with this, though the atheist does not 
believe Him to have done so. They may come to enjoy talking to God, 
and think that if God exists He is good and caring and wise, all while 
believing that God does not exist. They may regularly act in accordance 
with what God indicates is His will, though they believe that this is not 
what has been indicated to them. For instance, an atheist may pray to 
ask whether it is God’s will that they move, and a moment later find a 
moving truck in their driveway and a driver asking for directions. The 
atheist may believe that this is merely a coincidence, but act as if it were 
an indication from God because they are ambivalent about the choice 
anyway, and on the off-chance that God does exist, it wouldn’t be ter-
rible to act as He wills. Atheists, if God exists, may share in many of the 
benefits of prayer that theists enjoy, and may thereby share much of the 
motivation for prayer as well. And, if God does not exist, then praying 
atheists and theists are again similar, for neither is a recipient of God-
involving goods.
Two final notes on the variety of ways atheistic prayer may manifest. 
First, several authors have argued or assumed that praying to God re-
quires hoping that God exists.23 Even if this is not true of prayer in general, 
we may be tempted to endorse it for atheistic prayer in particular: we may 
think that prayer does not require belief in God, and that prayer is even 
compatible with disbelief in God. But, we may think, the atheist must 
have at least some kind of pro-attitude toward God’s existence in order to 
pray.24 We may settle on hope as a good candidate: even if the atheist does 
23See Muyskens, The Sufficiency of Hope; Pojman, Religious Belief and The Will; and Lemos, 
“An Agnostic Defense of Obligatory Prayer.”
24There is a related question, brought to my attention by Mark Murphy, of whether one 
must have some sort of pro-attitude toward God in order to pray. One might think that in 
order to conceive of God (at least, qua God), you must recognize that God is good. And in 
order to direct communication at God, you must conceive of God (or: in order to direct 
communication at God qua God, you must conceive of God qua God). I’m unsure of the claim 
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not accept God’s existence, or resolve to generally act as if God exists, the 
atheist must at least hope God exists. Otherwise, why are they praying?
In response to this, I should first point out that it is not clear to me that 
the atheist must have any pro-attitude toward God’s existence in order 
to pray. It is not clear to me that the atheist must hope that God exists, 
or even must allow for the epistemic possibility that God exists. Though 
it may be hard to imagine why an atheist would pray to a God they are 
certain does not exist, it is not clearly an impossible or irrational task. (For 
more on this, see §4.2.) Second, even if we think there must be some pro-
attitude, it is implausible for hope to play this role unless we think it is 
required for all prayer. And it is not a plausible requirement for all prayer. 
A theist may prefer that God not exist: imagine a less resilient Job, for 
instance. And similarly, an atheist may feel relieved at the likelihood that 
God does not exist, and fearful about the epistemic possibility (however 
small) that He does exist. For instance, consider a serial-murdering atheist 
on his deathbed. The murderer may strongly believe that God does not 
exist, but may also think that if God does exist, his afterlife will be terrible, 
much worse than nonexistence. With nothing else to do, the murderer 
may pray for forgiveness and a small amount of mercy in his last mo-
ments, all while believing and strongly hoping that no divine entity hears 
his prayers. Dread, regret, or fear of God’s existence are neither off-limits 
to theists, nor reserved for them.
Second, we should ask about any limitations on the content of atheistic 
prayer. If an atheist believes God does not exist, can the atheist give thanks 
to God through prayer? Can the atheist praise God, if the atheist does 
not endorse the predications? Can an atheist express anger at God? There 
are multiple options for how one may go in response to this. First, the 
atheist may appeal to a positive free logic: they may believe (but perhaps 
not be certain) that “God” is an empty name for a deity. They may think 
that predicates can be truly applied to the noun-phrase “God” without 
this entailing that a referent of “God” exists. Andrew Bacon has shown 
how a positive free logic can help us make sense of seemingly true state-
ments about fictional characters, such as the sentence “Sherlock Holmes 
is an excellent detective.”25 When our atheist prays to God, they may take 
themselves to be making similar statements, and they may even believe 
the statements are about a fictional character, but they may not be certain 
of that.
Alternatively, we may opt for a response that posits less similarity 
between the content of theistic prayers and atheistic ones. Atheistic ex-
pressions of thanksgiving, praise, anger, and so on, may be somehow 
conditional in a way theistic expressions are not. This option has some 
that conceiving of God (even qua God) requires recognition that God is good, but the ques-
tion illustrates that the issue of what’s required for prayer is more complicated than it may 
initially seem.
25Bacon, “Quantificational Logic and Empty Names.” 
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support from analogous cases. For instance, suppose you are roaming the 
library looking for Bernadete’s Infinity, and have been expressing frus-
tration under your breath for the last few minutes. You return to a table 
you’ve passed before, and see it perched on the edge. You think you’re 
alone in this part of the library, and that you must’ve just missed the book 
earlier. But you think there is a tiny chance that someone else was in the 
library, heard your muttering about the book, saw it, and set it out for 
you. You say loudly, “Thank you!” in case such a person is in the room. 
You aren’t straightforwardly grateful, but somehow you are conditionally 
thankful. Other attitudes can have conditional flavors as well. For instance, 
suppose I receive a copy of Casati and Varzi’s Holes, with a bunch of holes 
punched in the cover. I believe that this was done in the production of the 
book, but I feel a zing of anger considering the possibility that someone 
thought it’d be funny to use a hole-puncher on this particular book before 
sending it to me. I don’t believe such a person exists, but have a negative 
attitude toward any such person. Conditional guilt is also common: “I’m 
sorry if . . . ” is commonly used when we’re not sure whether our actions 
had a negative outcome, but it may also be used if we aren’t sure if our ac-
tions had a victim (and may be directed toward any such potential victim). 
These cases indicate that there is precedent for conditional reactions and 
the statements that express them. It may be that whatever story we tell for 
such statements can be applied to atheistic prayer as well.
4. The Epistemic Incoherence Objection
Atheistic prayer seems to depend on the ability to direct communication 
toward someone while believing they do not exist. Our response to the 
Intentionality Argument involved claiming that such communicative at-
tempts can occur when directed at non-divine entities, so we should think 
they can occur when directed at divine entities as well.
But, one may object, we should not be so fast to claim that this sort 
of activity can occur even in non-divine contexts. Directing communica-
tion toward some entity while believing it does not exist entails a kind of 
epistemic incoherence, which is either metaphysically impossible or epis-
temically reprehensible. Neither outcome is a good result for our atheist 
attempting prayer. This is the Epistemic Incoherence Objection.
4.1. The Might Argument
One way to put forward the Epistemic Incoherence Objection is to appeal 
to the role of beliefs about what might be the case. Consider the Post-Apoc-
alyptic Call case. The proponent of this objection may claim that in this 
case, it seems that by attempting the call Adam displays that he is unsure 
of whether someone will pick up. That is, it’s a live epistemic possibility 
for him that there will be someone on the other end of the line. Otherwise, 
why bother? And in the Post-Apocalyptic Conversation case, by repeating 
his address, Adam displays that he thinks there might be someone else 
hearing it. Adam is showing that he is not certain that there is no one at 
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the other end of the line. Similarly, the proponent of this objection may 
continue, when a supposed-atheist attempts prayer, they are showing that 
they at least believe that God might exist. And if an atheist were to react to 
something (such as the appearance of a moving truck) as if it were a sign 
from God, they are indicating that they believe it at least might be a sign 
from God.
This, though, looks problematic. The proponent of this objection will 
claim that it is either metaphysically impossible to believe might(P) and ¬P, 
or it is epistemically inconsistent. Someone cannot really, or at least con-
sistently, believe that God does not exist if, at the same time, they endorse 
that God might exist, and so admit to themselves that they cannot rule 
out His existence. So when so-called atheists pray, they are at that time 
(and perhaps other times as well) either not really atheists, or not consis-
tent atheists. Similarly, when Adam makes his call in the post-apocalyptic 
wasteland, he either does not really believe that there is no one at the other 
end of the line, or he has inconsistent beliefs. The actions of these individ-
uals show what they think might be the case, and that gives us information 
about what they consistently believe.
The proponent of this objection might give an argument like this one:
The Might Argument
1. Necessarily, if a subject prays to God, then the subject believes God 
might exist.
2. Necessarily, the belief that God might exist is either metaphysically 
or epistemically incompatible with the belief that God does not exist.
3. So, necessarily, if a subject believes God might exist, then either the 
subject does not believe God does not exist, or the subject is epis-
temically inconsistent.
4. Necessarily, if you do not believe God does not exist, then you are 
not an atheist.
5. So, praying to God is incompatible with being an epistemically con-
sistent atheist.
Premise (4) follows from what it means to be an atheist (as we’re under-
standing the term), so the work is being done by premises (1) and (2). I will 
briefly say a bit more about why one may find (2) plausible.
Seth Yalcin has pointed out that epistemic modals can produce con-
junctive statements that have some similarity to Moore’s paradox.26 With 
Moore’s paradox, we find statements of the form “P, and I don’t know that 
P” unacceptable. We may hope to explain this via appeal to a norm of as-
sertion: you shouldn’t assert something unless you take yourself to know 
26Yalcin, “Epistemic Modals.” 
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it (or at least, don’t believe you don’t know it). Thus, we may hope to give 
a wholly pragmatic explanation of the unacceptability of the statement.
Yalcin points out that sentences of the form “P, and Might(¬P)” also 
sound unacceptable. Saying, for instance, that it might not be raining, 
seems to communicate that you have not ruled out it’s not raining. But 
if you haven’t ruled out it’s not raining, then you shouldn’t assert that it 
is raining. But this pragmatic issue, Yalcin argues, cannot be the whole 
problem. For epistemic modal conjunctions, unlike Moorean conjunc-
tions, cannot be embedded in conditionals and as suppositions. Consider 
the sentence “If it’s raining, but it might not be raining, then give me the 
umbrella” and “Suppose it is raining, and it might not be raining.” Both 
of these strike us as strange, and perhaps even as unintelligible. If the 
problem with epistemic modal conjunctions was entirely about their 
assertability, we would expect the problem to resolve with their being em-
bedded rather than asserted. But the problem persists, suggesting that the 
problem is with the semantic content of the conjunction. That is, it looks 
like there is an inconsistency or impossibility in the combination of P and 
Might(¬P).
Atheists (as we are using the term) endorse the claim that God does not 
exist. But also (perhaps due to having some degree of epistemic humility), 
many take themselves to be unable to rule out with certainty that God 
does exist, and will readily accept that God might exist. Praying atheists 
give us even more evidence that they think God might exist, and are re-
acting to the very fact that they haven’t ruled out His existence. So, these 
atheists should (pragmatic and practical issues aside) be willing to assert 
each of: “God does not exist” and “It might be that God exists.” But if they 
are willing to assert each of these, they should also be willing (again, prag-
matic and practical issues aside) to assert their conjunction. So, at the very 
least, praying atheists face a puzzle about how to explain the apparent 
unacceptability of a conjunction they should be willing to assert. Worse, 
though, is this: if the conjunction is problematic because its semantic con-
tent is inconsistent, then in order to endorse each of the conjuncts our 
atheist will have to have inconsistent beliefs. If one takes this to be impos-
sible, then either our subject is not an atheist or does not really think God 
might exist. If one takes it to be possible, our atheist seems epistemically 
inconsistent.
4.2. Responses to the Might Argument
There are many ways of responding to Yalcin’s argument about epistemic 
conjunctions27 as well as many ways of responding to the application of 
that argument to the issue of praying atheists. I will cover just a few of the 
responses here.
27See, for instance, Schneider, “Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals”; Crabill, 
“Suppose Yalcin is Wrong About Epistemic Modals”; and Schroeder, Expressing Our Atti-
tudes. 
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First, in response to the Might Argument, we may simply say that acting 
as if something is a live epistemic possibility for you is not a guarantee 
that it is a live possibility for you. And one needn’t be acting irrationally 
for this to be the case. For instance, consider: a child believes there are 
faeries in her closet. She asks her mom to say “good night” to the faeries. 
The mother, absolutely confident that there are no such faeries, says “to 
any faeries in my daughter’s closet, goodnight and sleep tight!” The aim 
of the action is not to communicate. Nonetheless, this seems to be an ex-
ample of a communicative act directed at entities with particular features. 
And this is so in spite of the subject’s failing to think that such entities even 
just might exist.
One might resist this response, however. One may maintain that in the 
faeries case, the mother is simply pretending to produce a communica-
tive act, rather than really doing so. Also, even if this first response to the 
Might Argument is successful, it would not help establish the possibility 
of atheistic prayer for any atheist who believes that God might exist. And 
such atheists are not uncommon. When talking about motivation for athe-
istic prayer, it is common to note that atheists often hope (though they 
believe it will not be so) that their prayers will be heard and answered. 
Such atheists may readily grant that they think God might exist, though 
they also believe He does not. What are we to make of such atheists?
First, we should note that the epistemic inconsistency worry is not re-
stricted to praying atheists, or even to atheists at all. Praying atheists are 
not the only sort of atheist to readily admit that, though they believe God 
does not exist, they are not certain that He does not exist. That is, this 
issue arises for any atheist who, on the basis of being unwilling to say they 
are certain that God does not exist, concedes that God might exist. And 
more importantly, this general problem is not just an issue for atheists, it 
is an issue for anyone who thinks that they believe something, but who 
also fails to believe it with certainty and so is willing to concede that the 
contrary might be the case. This is not at all uncommon. For instance, I be-
lieve that the sun will not explode within the next year. I am not, however, 
absolutely certain this is the case. In that sense, I think it might be true that 
the sun will explode within the next year, though I disbelieve it. So, if the 
problem of epistemic inconsistency is an issue for praying atheists, it is an 
issue for many, many people.
What should we say about this general problem? First, though intu-
itions push in favor of the unacceptability of epistemic modal conjunctions, 
intuitions also push strongly for the compatibility of belief and lack of cer-
tainty. Intuitively, we needn’t rule out something with certainty in order 
to believe its negation. We can believe something without being sure. And 
plausibly, this is not epistemically inconsistent or objectionable. Perhaps it 
would be better if we always had excellent evidence and were able to jus-
tifiably believe with certainty in all things we endorse. But given that we 
do not always have such exceptional evidence, but still often have good 
172 Faith and Philosophy
evidence, belief without certainty seems appropriate. Belief with a dose of 
epistemic humility is a good thing. So, insofar as a subject’s believing that 
they cannot rule something out entails that they believe it might be so, 
we should accept that subjects can believe something might be true while 
believing its negation, and we should take this to be an often reasonable 
and commendable combination of attitudes.
This appeal to intuitions is not, however, a complete response to the 
epistemic inconsistency worry. For we need to also explain why we have 
strong intuitions that epistemic modal conjunctions are unacceptable. 
Here is one way that we may attempt to do so. So far, in my discussion 
of responses to the Might Argument, I have been treating “might” as if it 
should be read as “I can’t rule it out with certainty.” That is, I have been 
using the following is a very weak sense of “might”:
“might be true” =df is not ruled out with certainty28
The fact that this sense of “might be true” is so weak is part of why it is 
so plausibly compatible with a wide variety of beliefs. Stronger senses of 
“might” are less plausibly widely compatible. A clear example:
“might be true” =df is compatible with the content of my beliefs
This sense of “might” gives a straightforward contradiction in the con-
tent of the beliefs of a subject who believes both that might(P) and (¬P). 
Here, then, is a partial explanation for the unacceptability of our epistemic 
modal conjunctions: when we say something of the form “Might(P) and 
(¬P),” “might” is heard in the strong sense, leading to incompatibility of 
the conjuncts and unembeddability of the statement. If we were to take 
“might” in the weaker sense, though the initial conjunction may still 
sound strange, it is no longer unembeddable. Consider: “I’m not certain 
that P, but P” still sounds strange to us, but “Suppose I’m not certain that 
P, but P” does not sound strange. This indicates that when statements of 
epistemic modal conjunctions involve “might” with a weak reading, the 
problems with them are merely pragmatic rather than generated by the 
content of the conjuncts.
In attempting to respond to the Might Argument, then, we may say 
the following: premise (1) of the argument is only plausible when we use 
a weak reading of “might,” taking it to mean that what it is applied to 
hasn’t been ruled out with certainty. Premise (2), on the other hand, is only 
plausible when using a stronger sense of “might,” such as being compat-
ible with the content of my beliefs. The Might Argument seems to involve 
equivocation.
A natural initial move in response to this is to claim that praying athe-
ists are committed to believing that God might exist, in the stronger sense 
28Importantly, I intend these definitions to be rough, general-ballpark definitions. I defi-
nitely do not think these are plausible, exact accounts of any of the readings of “might,” but 
I do take them to be in the right general area.
173ATHEISTIC PRAYER
of “might.” It is up to the proponent of the Might Argument to support 
this. They may try to do so by claiming the following:
The Actions Speak Louder Principle: Necessarily, anyone who acts as if P 
is true, takes P to be a live possibility.
There are many ways that we might precisely formulate this principle, 
each corresponding to different notions of taking P to be a live possibility. 
Just a few options: (a) not having any beliefs incompatible with P, (b) not 
believing one has any beliefs in the truth of anything incompatible with P, 
(c) failing to disbelieve that P, and so on. Regardless of how we precisely 
formulate it, however, the general idea behind the Actions Speak Louder 
Principle is the same: anyone who acts as if P is true has doxastic states 
that are also somehow in accordance with P’s truth.
However, this general idea is false. To see why, consider something you 
believe arbitrarily strongly, but are not absolutely certain about. Suppose 
you are offered a bet: you pay a penny if you are right in your belief, but 
you get an arbitrarily high sum of money if you are wrong. I imagine that 
most would take the bet. But that means that for any belief that we do not 
hold with absolute certainty, we are disposed to act as if its negation is a 
live possibility (at least, in some sense). And according to the proponent of 
the Actions Speak Louder Principle, if we were to suddenly find ourselves 
in a betting situation like this one for any of our beliefs that we do not hold 
with certainty, we would no longer have those beliefs (or would not be-
lieve we had them, or would not believe they were incompatible with their 
negations). This does not seem to be the right description of the doxastic 
states of the agents in betting situations like these. So this attempt to show 
that praying atheists endorse the claim that God might exist, in the strong 
sense of “might,” does not seem to be successful.
So, worries about epistemic modal conjunctions seem to apply to ev-
eryone; it is not a special issue for praying atheists. And attempts to raise 
special concerns involving epistemic modal conjunctions for praying 
atheists, via appeal to the activity of prayer indicating that God’s exis-
tence is being treated as a live possibility, appear unsuccessful. There is 
much more to say, of course, but my hope is that I have shown that the 
proponent of the possibility of atheistic prayer has plausible avenues of 
response to each of the two arguments offered against it.29
University of Southern California
29Thank you to John Hawthorne, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Mark Murphy, Jake Ross, 
Mark Schroeder, two anonymous referees, and the participants of the 2016 Faith Workshop 
for helpful discussion on these topics. I am also grateful to the Templeton Religion Trust for 
a grant supporting me as I wrote this paper. (The opinions expressed here are mine, and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton Religion Trust.)
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